20 August 2026 · Falah Mousa
In 2025, the EU imported €559 billion worth of goods from China and exported approximately €200 billion worth of goods to China. Although this gap is significant, the greater concern lies beneath it.
Chinese manufacturers have built massive production capacity. China’s domestic market cannot absorb everything they produce, so more goods are pushed into global markets, and Europe has long been one of the most important destinations for these products. For European consumers, this can mean lower prices, but for European business and industry, the picture is very different.
The European Commission is asking European businesses to invest significantly in clean technologies, battery production, electric vehicles, advanced manufacturing and industrial security. At the same time, many Chinese competitors operate on a much larger scale and benefit from strong state support. This creates a clear contradiction in EU policy.
On one hand, the EU advocates for “strategic autonomy” and a stronger industrial base. On the other hand, it remains heavily reliant on imports of manufactured goods, machinery, components and technology from China. Tariffs on certain Chinese imports may slow those imports, but they will not resolve the fundamental problem.
If Europe wishes to maintain its status as an industrial power, it must determine which industries are strategically important, where dependence on another country becomes dangerous, and which sectors it is willing to protect or rebuild. Until then, “strategic autonomy” will continue to be little more than an empty phrase used by politicians.
The ultimate question is straightforward: How much industrial dependence will Europe tolerate before that dependence becomes a political liability?
#Europe #China #PoliticalEconomy #Trade #IndustrialPolicy #Geopolitics
Falah Mousa 